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1. Introduction 
The competitiveness of organic farming depends on products’ diversification and quality in 
comparison with conventional farming. Certification is a crucial element in the organic system to 
assure and maintain the required standards for organic production, and to guarantee the quality of 
organic products to consumers. In the European Union certification through an accredited body is 
required by Regulation (EC) No 834/2007 (EC 2007). Through direct and indirect costs of 
certification procedure affects relative profitability of organic operators (Stolze, 2012). A more 
efficient certification system may contribute to reduce transaction costs (Zorn et al., 2012), and to 
increase organic system competitiveness while still maintaining the benefits of trustworthy 
organic labelling. This goal can be achieved by developing a cost-effective inspection programme 
that provides assurance of acceptable integrity and reliability, hence shifting the organic 
certification system more towards a risk based strategy. Risk-based inspections systems use the 
findings from a formal risk analysis – according to defined criteria – to guide the direction and 
emphasis of the inspection planning and the physical inspection procedures. The potentials for a 
risk-based inspection system in organic certification have been recently discussed in Padel (2010) 
and Dabbert (2012). In the context of a risk-based inspection system, the evaluation of risk is 
directly dependent on the definition of risk that is assumed. Two regulations can be considered 
for what concerns the definition of the risk of non-compliance. The European food law laying 
down general principles and requirements of food law defines risk as “a function of the 
probability of an adverse health effect and the severity of that effect, consequential to a hazard” 
(Art 3(9) of Regulation (EC) No 178/2002) (EC, 2002). A more specific reference to risk 
(Regulation (EC) No 834/2007) (EC, 2007) refers to the probability that non-compliance with the 
organic regulation occurs, irrespective of the magnitude of the direct social damage potentially 
associated with it. In this paper we have considered the latter definition. See van Asselt et al. 
(2012) for a discussion on methodological aspects of risk-based controls in the food sector, and 
Hutter and Amodu (2008) for an analysis of risk management in food safety in UK. Gambelli et 
al. (2012) and Zorn et l. (2013), provide an analysis of the determinants of non-compliance 
respectively for the Italian and German organic sector.  
The aim of this paper is to provide a risk-based analysis of non-compliance in the organic 
certification system in UK. We used a formal econometric model of risk analysis to provide 
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empirical evidence on the determinants of non-compliance in organic farming. A panel of data 
from the archives of the largest control body in the UK for 2007 to 2009 is used, and specific 
analyses are performed for two types of non-compliances. A zero inflated count data model is 
used for the estimation, taking into account the fact that the occurrences of noncompliance are 
very sparse. 
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 provides a description of the organic 
certification system in the UK, Section 3 describes the data used for the analysis, Section 4 
describe the model used for the analysis, Section 5 provides description and discussion of  results, 
and Section 6 concludes the paper. 
2. The organic certification system in the UK 
Organic agriculture in the UK has long history, dating back to Lady Eve Balfour who founded the 
Soil Association in 1946 with the first standard published in 1967, their structure serving as an 
example for other standards, followed by a first governmental standards (UKORFS) published in 
1987. The number of farms has increased from approximately 300 holdings in 1985 to nearly 
5,000 by 2009. The UK is an important producer of organic in terms of land area (738,709 ha, 
4,946 producers) and was in 2009 the third largest market in Europe terms of retail sales value 
after Germany and France (Willer and Kilcher, 2010). The largest land area is found in England 
(50.2%), followed by Scotland (33.8%) and Wales (14.3%), with the remainder in Northern 
Ireland (1.7%). Important land use categories are grassland, both temporary pasture/clover 
(17.2% of organic and in-conversion) and permanent pasture including rough grazing (67.1%), 
followed by cereals and other arable crops (9.6%) and fresh vegetable incl. potatoes (2.5%). 
Important species livestock are dairy cow, beef and sheep for meat production and poultry. In 
Table 1 these are shown compared to the annual June Survey of Agriculture data (DEFRA, 
2012). 
<Place Table 1 about here> 
The UK has a system of accredited private organic certification bodies which are overseen in 
their activities by the Organic Farming Branch of the Department for the Environment, Food and 
Rural Affairs in England (DEFRA) fulfilling the legislative function of the Competent Authority 
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for the whole of the UK. DEFRA is assisted by the by the UK Accreditation Service UKAS that 
also accredits the control bodies according to European Norm EN 45011.    
In 2009, nine control bodies were registered in the UK (EC, 2012, two of which are Irish 
bodies operating only in Northern Ireland
1
.  
The Soil Association is the largest control body operating a private standard that is different 
from the Regulation (EC) No 834/2007 (EC, 2007) for organic food. According to information 
provided by the organisation, the Soil Associations Standards exceed the EU Regulation 
especially in areas concerning the environment and animal welfare and includes standards for 
areas not covered by government or EU regulations, such as conservation, textiles and health and 
beauty care products
2
. The organic rules database lists 61 differences between the previous 
Regulation (EEC) No 2091/91 (EEC, 1991) and the Soil Association standard based on a detailed 
comparison of the standards carried out in 2005 (see Schmidt et al. 2007 for details of the 
comparison). The differences relate to various aspects of livestock production, on farm 
biodiversity and conservation, use of fertilisers and other inputs and horticultural crops
3
. The Soil 
Association certified about 48% of all producers and 72% of all 1,798 organic processors in the 
UK in 2009 (unpublished information provided by DEFRA). 
3. Data description 
The data used in this research have been extracted from an anonymized version of the archives 
of Soil Association
4
 on inspections and controls on organic operators licensed with them. The 
dataset consists of a panel of 5,912 observations referring to 2,346 farms observed over the 2007-
2009 period and represents about 44% of total UK organic farms (Lampkin et al., 2011). The 
panel is unbalanced, i.e. not all the farms are recorded for the same number of years. However, it 
is quite homogeneous, as 1,516 farms (64.6% of the sample) were observed over all time periods 
and 518 farms (22.1% of the sample) were observed for two consecutive years. The data are 
                                                 
1 These are Organic Farmers and Growers Ltd (OF&G-UK2), Scottish Organic Producer Association (SOPA-UK3, Scotland 
only), Organic Food Federation (OFF-UK4), Soil Association Certification Ltd (UK5), Bio-Dynamic Agriculture Association 
(BDAA -UK6), Quality Welsh Food Certification (QWFC, UK13, Wales only) and ASISCO (UK15).   
2 http://www.soilassociation.org/certification [accessed 20 March 2012] 
3 http://www.organicrules.org [accessed 20 March 2012] 
4Soil Association Ltd. is the leading certifier of organic food in the UK and is one of the partners of the CERTCOST project.  
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collected by the control body for the purpose of client administration and to provide various 
statistical data to the competent authority. The dataset provides information at the farm level on 
structural-managerial characteristics and detected non-compliance. Inspection visits are 
distinguished into mandatory annual inspections, follow-up inspections in case of previous non-
compliance, and unannounced inspections. Non-mandatory inspections are on average 5.8% of 
total inspections in the three years considered. Information about non-compliances originates 
from the inspectors report that is filled in during the visit by the inspector who can issue three 
categories of non-compliances (see Table 2).  Information about the reasons causing the non-
compliance was only available from a free text source and could not be used in the analysis. All 
cases of critical non-compliance are referred to the certification department, where decisions 
about manifest non-compliances and sanctions and/or termination of licences are taken. This 
information was not re-entered into the client database and could therefore not be used for this 
analysis.  
The share of detected noncompliance over the number of controls are likely to change 
according to type of inspection. For what concern annual inspections, the share of noncompliance 
ranges from 42.1% for minor noncompliance to 8.8% for major noncompliance and 1.5% for 
critical noncompliance. When non mandatory inspections are considered (namely: follow up and 
unannounced inspections) the share of noncompliance ranges from 51.8% for minor 
noncompliance to 20.6% for major noncompliance and 8.9% for critical noncompliance. For both 
mandatory and non mandatory inspections the share of detected minor noncompliance is 
substantially higher than that referring to major and critical non compliances. However the 
difference between mandatory and non mandatory inspection in term of detected non compliance 
are remarkable, particularly for what concern major and critical noncompliance. These results 
show that non-mandatory inspections can be considered as a critical element of organic 
certification.
5
 Planning of non-mandatory inspections could be established through a strict 
partnership between third party control bodies and  group of farmers which implement Internal 
                                                 
5 This statistics should not be considered as representative of the organic sector in UK, since it’s based on data from one 
control bodies operating in UK and represents therefore only a share of organic operators.  
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Control System (ICS). See Moschitz (2011) and Rehber (2011) for more details on the group 
certification and internal auditing system.  
<Place Table 2 about here> 
The frequencies of the different types of non-compliance are shown in Table 3. The share of 
compliant farmers is the highest: most farmers have no minor, major or critical non-compliance. 
For all the three years, the number of minor non-compliance was higher than the number of major 
non-compliance. The share of minor non-compliance is relatively stable across the three years, 
while the share of major non-compliance showed an increase from 5.8% in 2007 to 9.1% in 2009. 
Critical non-compliance is particularly sparse but shows a considerable increase in 2009. The 
number of non-compliant farms is negatively related to the number of non-compliances 
occurrence per year, i.e. farms with two or more non-compliance are less numerous. However 
about 46% and 24% of non-compliant farms have on average respectively more than one minor 
or major non-compliance. 
<Place Table 3 about here> 
 
Our aim is to explain the number of non-compliance occurring at the farm level using a set of 
risk factors, the choice of which was necessarily limited by data availability. The list of the 
potential risk factors we have taken into consideration is shown in Table 4. The dataset has been 
trimmed to eliminate observations with incomplete data (e.g. farms with no information on type 
of crop and livestock production) and two farm with abnormally large size (above 14,000 ha). 
When referring to dichotomous variables, the mean indicates the percentage of farms where that 
variable is present. The risk factors have been clustered into two groups: general risk factors, and 
managerial risk factors. General risk factors refers to non-compliance evidence, farm types, farm 
size, presence of conventional land and farm/farmer’s experience as organic. We use data on non-
compliance as a proxy for non-compliant attitude of farmers. Evidence of major and/or critical 
non-compliance is used to consider potential co-dependence effects on the risk of minor non-
compliance (Model 1), and evidence of minor and/or critical non-compliance are used to consider 
potential co-dependence effects on the risk of major non-compliance (Model 2). Farm types 
dummies are included to discriminate the potential effects and differences due to the different 
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categories of farms, and to take into account the structural differences in terms of risk of 
noncompliance that might be due to the general structure of the farms. Four farm types are 
considered: arable, livestock, horticulture and mixed. The arable farm type refers to farms where 
only arable crops are cultivated, with no livestock production and no fruit and horticulture 
production. The horticulture farm type refers to farms specialised in fruit, vegetables, glasshouse 
crops, herbs and aromatic plants, with no livestock and no arable crops productions. The 
livestock farm type include farms with livestock breeding (cattle, sheep, pigs, poultry). In this 
farm type farms with grassland and/or crop production (excluding horticulture) are also 
considered. Finally the mixed farm type includes farms with a mixture of crops and livestock, not 
classified in other farm type due to mixed status, e.g. a farm with a combination of livestock, 
arable and horticultural production
6
. Please note that each farm in our sample is univocally 
classified in one of the four farm types (i.e. the four farm types are mutually exclusive and 
orthogonal).  
For what concerns the other general risk factors, we expect that the presence of conventional 
land in the farm is an indicator of a not complete involvement of the farmer in the organic 
approach. About 25% of the farms in our dataset have conventional land, and for these the 
average share of land managed organically is 72.3%. Finally we expect that farmers with less 
experience in organic farming might be more likely to commit errors or could be more likely 
driven by opportunistic motivations to farm organically. The variable “Farmers’ experience as 
organic” should be considered as a proxy, since information on the actual number of years the 
farm has been managed organically was not available.  This variable measures the number of 
years a farmer is certified by Soil Association, so it does ignore possible years of certification 
with different control bodies in the past. Furthermore, for most operators that registered with the 
Soil Association prior to May 1999 the same date was used when the electronic recording system 
was set up. Therefore this data underestimates actual farmers’ experience, but is nevertheless 
used in the analysis to discriminate farmers who joined the certification body more recently from 
those who joined earlier. In fact, a farmer certified for a short period could be one newly 
converted or one changing certification body for some reason, possibly opportunistic: for the 
purpose of our risk analysis both options could be relevant. Finally, farm size can be considered a 
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risk factor because a large farm could be more difficult to manage and because the potential 
benefits from opportunistic behaviours could be more rewarding when referring to large 
production sizes.  
Crops and livestock types are taken into consideration to identify possible enterprises that 
could specifically increase the risk of non-compliance. A large share of farms have grassland, 
fodder, and cereals, which represent the core of the farming rotation and is comparable to the 
general organic sector in the UK (see above). The sample is strongly characterised by farms with 
livestock production and particularly by grazing livestock. Important livestock categories are 
cattle and sheep
7
 (49.9% and 34.1% of farms with cattle and sheep respectively), followed by 
poultry (15.3% of the farms) and pigs (8.2% of the farms).  
 <Place Table 4 about here> 
4. Model specification  
A discrete count data model was used to measure the marginal contribution of each risk factor 
on the probability of a higher number of non-compliance occurrences. Standard count data 
models like Poisson or negative binomial models in our case are most likely mispecified since the 
large share of zeroes would violate the distributional requirements of those models. The reason 
for the large share of zeroes in non-compliance records could be due mainly to two reasons. The 
first one is that organic farmers are ethically involved and therefore “normally compliant”. Some 
studies concerning motivations to conversion in UK (Rigby et al., 2001; Padel 2001, 2008) show 
how personal motivations, like ethical, social and environmental concerns, play an important role 
in the decision for conversion. We therefore expect that as a general rule organic farmers tend to 
actively comply with the regulations, as indicated from data shown in Table 2. However, non-
compliance can occur due to: a) managerial faults, e.g. due to lack of knowledge standards or to 
structural and managerial characteristics of the farm; b) intentional frauds due to opportunistic 
behaviours.  
The second reason for zero inflation is due to the potential under-reporting of non-compliance. 
Necessarily, we only have records concerning non-compliance that is actually detected, but we 
                                                 
7 Goats are grouped together with sheep. However farms with goats account for less than 1% of total farms in the sample.  
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have no idea about the number and kind of non-compliances that could escape the inspections. 
Reasons for potentially undetected non-compliances could be: the timing of the visit (e.g. a 
farmer could commit a non-compliance after the annual control visit), the effectiveness of the 
inspection visit, the percentage of (product/soil) samples taken, the number of unannounced 
visits, etc. We assume that the under-reporting effect is randomly distributed at the farmer-
individual level. This issue addresses the fundamental statistical problem of underreporting in 
similar systems, which appears because not all non-compliances are detected and recorded in the 
data (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972; Feinstein, 1991; Sandmo, 2002, Winkelmann & 
Zimmermann, 1995; Winkelmann, 1996). 
To solve the zero-inflation problem we use a zero-inflated Poisson (ZIP) model specification 
in a random-effect panel format. The under-reporting factor, which introduces individual 
heterogeneity in the model, is captured by the individual random effect of the panel model 
(Cameron et al., 1998; Boucher and Guillén, 2009). For details on zero-inflated count data 
models see, among others, Lambert (1992), Mullahy (1986) and Greene (1994, 2007, 2008). 
Zero-inflated models consider a twofold generation process for the dependent variable (i.e. the 
number of non-compliance): a zero-state process where only zeroes are expected, and a count 
data process where count data (including some zeroes) are expected. The zero-state process refers 
to “normally compliant” farmers, following a logit distribution. The non-zero, or count process 
measures non-compliance occurrence due to managerial or intentional faults, following a Poisson 
distribution. The Poisson distribution was preferred to other distributional alternatives for its 
parsimony in parameters, which prevents over-parameterisation problems that might arise in 
panel count models (Greene, 2007). The expected number of non-compliances for the zero-state 
process is yit = 0 with a probability pit, while the expected number of non-compliances for the 
count process is yit = j, with a Poisson distribution and a probability Prob Yit = 1- pit.  
The probabilities of the possible outcomes are: 
 
(1) Prob (Yit = 0) = pit + (1- pit)Rit(0)          
(2) Prob (Yit = j >0) = (1- pit)Rit(j)          
 
Rit(y) is the Poisson probability = ; = exp(β’xit), where xit are the covariates of 
the count process;  
e−λitλit
yit
/yit! λit
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pit ~Logistic (vit); vit = γ’zit,  where zit are the covariates for the zero-state process. 
The zero-state part of the models is explained by the general risk factors, that we expect to 
discriminate between compliant and non-compliant attitudes (Table 3). We consider the lack of 
non-compliance evidence and of conventional land, small size of the farms (UAA) and the length 
of the farmer’s experience as organic, as indicators for “normally compliant” behaviours. We also 
include here three dummies for arable, livestock and mixed farm types (we exclude horticulture 
to avoid collinearity). The count process is explained by the set of structural and crops-livestock 
production risk factors (Table 3) that we expect may have an impact onto the likelihood of non-
compliance occurrence. Given the general lack of information on these issues, this part of the 
analysis resembles more a data mining exercise than a theory-based empirical testing, particularly 
with regards to the different crop and livestock productions.  
5. Results and discussion 
Both Model 1 and Model 2 have been formalised on the basis of the following hypothesis: need 
for a panel model estimation due to the relevance of farmers specific individual effects; the 
individual effects are distributed randomly (Random-effect model specification); need for a zero-
inflated count models due to the large share of zeroes in the dependent variables. Table 5 shows 
results for Model 1 and Model 2, and for the test of the hypothesis used for the models’ 
specification. For both models, the LR test for panel vs. pooled models confirms the requirement 
for the panel specification. A Hausman test for random vs. fixed effects models could not be 
computed due to the extremely low time-variation of most of the explanatory variables, which 
causes singularity in the covariance matrix of the fixed effects estimator. However, under such 
conditions the choice of the random effect option cannot be rejected (Greene,2008). These results 
are relevant as in our model individual random effects are considered as a proxy for the 
underreporting effect of non-compliance. Finally the Vuong test for ZIP vs. standard Poisson 
model confirms the requirement for a zero-inflated Poisson specification for a better fit of the 
zero-biased distribution of the dependent variables.  
The results of the estimated coefficients do not show risk-decreasing factors, and as a 
consequence, it is difficult to define specific low risk farm-types. Among the general risk factors 
used in the zero-state part of both Model 1 and Model 2, those referring to the co-dependence of 
non-compliance are found as statistically significant. The negative sign of the coefficients 
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indicate that they negatively affect the probability of zero non-compliance. In other words, the 
occurrence of major and critical non-compliance increases the probability of occurrence of the 
minor one; similarly the probability of occurrence of major non-compliance increases when 
minor non-compliance occur. These results are consistent with those of Gambelli et al. (2012; 
2012a, 2012b) and of Zorn et al. (2013). The relevance of co-dependence effects for non-
compliance can be interpreted as the indirect measurement of the farmers’ attitude to errors/fraud. 
Data on farmers’ personal characteristics, bank information, the debt history of the operator and 
their solvency, their criminal record, etc., could provide more detailed information, and improve 
the predictive power of the model (Dabbert, 2012). The livestock farm type is the only one with a 
significant impact on the likelihood of non-compliance in Model 1. For what concerns the other 
general risk factors, neither the presence of conventional land nor the experience of the farmer as 
organic show relevant impact on the probability of non-compliance occurrence. The experience 
of the farmer was used to consider the idea that recently converted farmers are moved more by 
opportunistic motivation, and hence could more likely be non-compliant and may also make 
more mistakes due to lack of experience. No evidence for this hypothesis comes from our 
models, and this result is compatible with those of Padel (2008) who showed that “later” organic 
farmer are not ethically less involved than the earlier converted ones.  
With reference to the count-regime part, the statistically significant risk factors in Model 1 are 
green fodder, root and industrial crops, and the livestock production in general that is confirmed 
as a critical risk factor. Green fodder, industrial crops and root crops are in fact indirectly related 
with livestock production as they can be used as animal feed. Furthermore, livestock production 
in general (cattle, sheep and poultry) is found as a relevant risk factor in the minor non-
compliance model. Other reason to consider arable crops as a specific risk factor could be that 
non-compliances for operators growing arable crops are related to the use of non-organic seed or 
the use of restructured inputs that would required prior permission of the control body. Many 
non-compliance occur because operators use non-approved inputs because of an ignorance of 
specific rule. These results are partly confirmed in the count-regime part of Model 2, that shows 
pigs production and green fodder as risk factors significantly increasing the likelihood of a high 
number of non-compliance. 
From the point of view of a risk-based model, the lack of relevance for some risk factors in 
both models can be considered a valuable information too. In particular specific production like 
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fruit and vegetables as well as indicators for farm size and complexity do not have a significant 
impact on the risk of non-compliance. 
<Place Table 5 about here> 
6. Concluding remarks 
The real causes of non-compliance are obviously latent, and the data available restricts our 
analysis to inferences referring to structural and managerial risk factors of a farm.  
Our empirical findings show that the share of non-compliant farmers in UK is low, 
particularly for what concerns the most severe types of non-compliance. The main factors 
contributing to the risk of non-compliance are: livestock production (particularly pigs), crops 
related to livestock breeding, and other non-compliant behaviours (co-dependence).  
Other risk factors like conventional area, and farmers’ experience as organic, have not 
emerged as relevant. These results are consistent with those of the limited literature on this issue, 
and represent an important step towards a more formalised and structured approach to inspections 
procedures. However these results are based on analysis of available data, which are mainly 
referring to structural aspects. We think that structural data are probably not sufficient for in-
depth risk-based modelling. An important share of the explanatory power of our models resides 
in behavioural factors represented by concurrent non-compliance, which behaves as a proxy of 
unmeasured farmers’ personal information. Therefore, we argue that the availability of farmers’ 
financial information like turnover or capital stock, and of data concerning the characteristics of 
the farmers, are likely to increase the ability of any model to predict the occurrence of non-
compliance, especially the most severe type. 
More in general, we conclude that shifting to risk-based inspections will uncontestably improve 
the effectiveness of organic certification, given the superior ability of probability-based models in 
spotting farmers with high risk of non-compliance over purely random or heuristic empirical 
methods. 
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Table 1 
 Organic land area timeseries UK  
Products (1000 Ha) 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
% change 
2011/2010 
Cereals 52 57 60 57 52 -7.7 
Other arable crops  11 11 11 11 9 -14.1 
Fresh vegetables (inc potatoes) 17 20 19 18 16 -12.7 
Fruit and nuts 2 2 2 2 2 -5.1 
Herbaceous & ornamentals 1 6 6 6 6 -1.0 
Temporary pastures 125 130 126 125 116 -6.9 
Permanent pastures (inc.rough grazing) 452 494 496 479 435  -9.2 
Woodland 11 6 7 8 8  2.5 
Unutilized land 11 18 12 12 11 -12.1 
Total organic land area 682 744 739 718 656 -8.7 
Source: DEFRA, 2012.  
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Table 2 
Classification of non-compliance (NC) 
Type of 
NC  
Effects of NC  
Minor  Does not directly compromise the integrity of the product but needs correction.  
Major  
May compromise the integrity of the product if not corrected, or may result from not correcting a 
previous minor non-compliance 
Critical  
Directly affects the integrity of the product, or may result from not correcting a previous major non-
compliance. A critical non-compliance will normally result in the withdrawing of certification from the 
products or enterprises affected or the whole licence. 
 
Manifest  
Integrity in the organic system has been lost. Manifest non-compliance may also result from not 
correcting a previous critical noncompliance. License could be partly or completely withdrawn. 
This category can only be noted by the inspector during the visit but is only issued after 
confirmation by the certification department and not stored in the same database.  
Source: Information provided by the Soil Association (2010) 
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Table 3 
 Distribution of farms by number of noncompliance (NC) and year 
 
Minor NC Major NC Critical NC 
 
2007 2008 2009 2007 2008 2009 2007 2008 2009 
Total farms 1,747 2,069 2,096 1,747 2,069 2,096 1,747 2,069 2,096 
Farms with no NC 1,139 
(65.2%) 
1,254 
(60.6%) 
1,321 
(63.0%) 
1,646 
(94.2%) 
1,906 
(92.1%) 
1,905 
(90.9%) 
1,733 
(99.2%) 
2,056 
(99.4%) 
2,051 
(97.8%) 
Farms with at least 
1 NC 
608 
(34.8%) 
815 
(39.4%) 
775 
(37.0%) 
101 
(5.8%) 
163 
(7.9%) 
191 
(9.1%) 
14 
(0.8%) 
13 
(0.6%) 
45 
(2.2%) 
of which:          
Farms with 1 NC 311 
(51.2%) 
428 
(52.5%) 
449 
(57.9%) 
73 
(72.3%) 
126 
(77.3%) 
154 
(80.6%) 
12 
(85.7%) 
12 
(92.3%) 
40 
(88.9%) 
Farms with 2 NC 152 
(25.0%) 
205 
(25.2%) 
178 
(23.0%) 
17 
(16.8%) 
26 
(16.0%) 
25 
(13.1%) 
1 
(7.1%) 
1 
(7.7%) 
5 
(11.1%) 
Farms with 3 NC 80 
(13.2%) 
99 
(12.1%) 
75 
(9.7%) 
6 
(5.9%) 
9 
(5.5%) 
7 
(3.7%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
1 
(0.0%) 
Farms with 4 NC 31 
(5.1%) 
48 
(5.9%) 
32 
(4.1%) 
2 
(2.0%) 
1 
(0.6%) 
3 
(1.6%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
Farms with 5 NC 16 
(2.6%) 
18 
(2.2%) 
18 
(2.3%) 
2 
(2.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
1 
(7.1%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
Farms with NC 6  18 
(3.0%) 
17 
(2.1%) 
23 
(3.0%) 
1 
(1.0%) 
1 
(0.6%) 
2 
(1.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
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Table 4 
 Potential risk factors for noncompliance (NC) considered in Model 1 and Model 2 
Variable Description Mean 
General risk factors   
Arable farm type  = 1 yes; = 0 no 0.247 
Horticulture farm type = 1 yes; = 0 no 0.050 
Livestock farm type  = 1 yes; = 0 no 0.465 
Mixed farm type = 1 yes; = 0 no 0.237 
Detection of Minor NC (Model 2 only) = 1 yes; = 0 no 0.372 
Detection of Major NC (Model 1 only) = 1 yes; = 0 no 0.077 
Detection of Critical NC (Model 1, 2) = 1 yes; = 0 no 0.012 
Conventional Area = 1 yes; = 0 no 0.252 
Farmer’s experience as organic Nr of years a farmer is certified by SA 
 Min: 0.03 Max:13.76  s.d.: 2.87 
6.436 
Farm Size UAA (ha)  
(Min: 0.01 Max: 2,598.54 s.d.: 233.25) 
137.966 
On-farm processing = 1 yes; = 0 no 0.072 
 
Crops and livestock production 
  
Cereals = 1 yes; = 0 no 0.393 
Dry Pulses = 1 yes; = 0 no 0.085 
Fruit = 1 yes; = 0 no 0.143 
Grasslands = 1 yes; = 0 no 0.833 
Green Fodder = 1 yes; = 0 no 0.546 
Industrial Crops = 1 yes; = 0 no 0.074 
Root Crops = 1 yes; = 0 no 0.098 
Vegetables = 1 yes; =0 no 0.243 
Cattle = 1 yes; =0 no 0.499 
Pigs = 1 yes; 0 = no 0.082 
Sheep and goats = 1 yes; 0 = no 0.344 
Poultry = 1 yes; 0 = no 0.153 
s.d: standard deviation 
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 Table 5 
Result coefficients for the minor and major noncompliance NC ZIP models 
Risk factors 
Minor NC Major NC 
Coeff.  Std. error Coeff.  Std. error 
Poisson-count regime 
Cereals .10832*  .04214 .07099  .10997 
Dry pulses -.08581  .06114 -.14409  .18121 
Fruit -.00800  .05194 -.28164  .18528 
Grasslands -.04226  .05684 .20279  .16441 
Green fodder .25406*** .03992 .30896** .10433 
Industrial crops .21826*** .05770 .03559  .18147 
Root crops .21260*** .05447 -.21276  .18204 
Vegetables .06193  .04438 -.04261  .13362 
Cattle .11913** .03954 .05030  .11851 
Pigs .21502*** .05770 .43967** .16294 
Sheep & Goats .10520 ** .03840 .02077  .11197 
Poultry .11156*  .04753 -.00448  .14541 
Constant -.42734** .06100 -1.67446***  .18903 
Zero-count (logit) regime 
Farm size -.03830 .02273 -.06013 .03278 
Conventional area -.17604 .10716 -.16131 .15683 
On-farm processing -.16316 .17575 .13830  .26061 
Farmer's experience as organic .03008  .01560 .02805  .02431 
Minor non-compliance -1.52047*** .14221 
Major non-compliance -2.67441*** .54042 
Critical non-compliance -2.52255 141.482 -10.16502 1003.47094 
Arable farm type  .14153  .20412 .24193  .42083 
Livestock farm type -.54894** .20408 .19207  .42674 
Mixed farm type -.34627 .20992 .25345  .42837 
Constant -.14130 .21558 1.47001** .45001 
Nr Observations 5,912 5,912 
AIC  2.239 .624 
BIC  2.266 .652 
Lr Test Panel vs Pooled  .000 .000 
Vuong test Zip vs Poisson -87.190 -33.693 
Levels of significance: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001  
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